论文标题
一些游戏理论营销归因模型
Some game theoretic marketing attribution models
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们提出和分析两个游戏理论模型，可分别基于合作tu游戏和破产问题设计营销渠道归因机制。首先，我们分析了Sum Game，这是Morales（2016）引入的联盟游戏。我们扩展了Zhao等人中引入的想法。 （2018）和Cano-Berlanga等。 （2017年）考虑到转换途径上的顺序和重复渠道的情况。在所有研究的情况下，提议将沙普利值作为归因机制。其次，提出了破产问题方法，并依靠受约束的相等损失（CEL）和比例（Prop）规则作为归因机制进行类似的分析。特别是要注意，归因类破产问题类别是破产问题的适当子类。
In this paper, we propose and analyse two game theoretical models useful to design marketing channels attribution mechanisms based on cooperative TU games and bankruptcy problems, respectively. First, we analyse the Sum Game, a coalitional game introduced by Morales (2016). We extend the ideas introduced in Zhao et al. (2018) and Cano-Berlanga et al. (2017) to the case in which the order and the repetition of channels on the paths to conversion are taken into account. In all studied cases, the Shapley value is proposed as the attribution mechanism. Second, a bankruptcy problem approach is proposed, and a similar analysis is developed relying on the Constrained Equal Loss (CEL) and Proportional (PROP) rules as attribution mechanisms. In particular, it is relevant to note that the class of attribution bankruptcy problems is a proper subclass of bankruptcy problems.
