论文标题
筛选突破
Screening for breakthroughs
论文作者
论文摘要
如何最好地激励及时披露？我们在一个通用模型中研究了这个问题，在一个通用模型中，在不确定的时间发生技术突破并由代理人私下观察到，并且本金必须通过控制与回报相关的物理分配来激励披露。我们发现了最佳机制的截止日期结构：它们在重要的特殊情况下具有简单的截止日期形式，并且总体上是一个渐变的截止日期结构。我们将结果应用于失业保险计划的设计。
How best to incentivise prompt disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclosure via her control of a payoff-relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes.
