论文标题
在实践中针对对称原语的量子期发现
Quantum Period Finding against Symmetric Primitives in Practice
论文作者
论文摘要
我们介绍了Simon算法的第一个完整实施，并估计其攻击Mac Chaskey，Block Cipher Prince和NIST轻量级候选AEAD计划大象的成本。 这些攻击需要合理数量的Qubit，与打破RSA-2048所需的量子数量相当。它们比其他碰撞算法快，对王子和查斯基的攻击是迄今为止最有效的。由于大象的钥匙小于其状态大小，因此该算法的效率较低，最终比详尽的搜索更昂贵。 我们还提出了布尔线性代数的优化量子电路，以及对王子，chaskey，spongent和keccak的完整可逆实现，这对量子隐性分析具有独立的兴趣。 我们强调的是，将来可以针对当今的通信进行攻击，并建议在预期长期安全的情况下选择对称结构时谨慎。
We present the first complete implementation of the offline Simon's algorithm, and estimate its cost to attack the MAC Chaskey, the block cipher PRINCE and the NIST lightweight candidate AEAD scheme Elephant. These attacks require a reasonable amount of qubits, comparable to the number of qubits required to break RSA-2048. They are faster than other collision algorithms, and the attacks against PRINCE and Chaskey are the most efficient known to date. As Elephant has a key smaller than its state size, the algorithm is less efficient and ends up more expensive than exhaustive search. We also propose an optimized quantum circuit for boolean linear algebra as well as complete reversible implementations of PRINCE, Chaskey, spongent and Keccak which are of independent interest for quantum cryptanalysis. We stress that our attacks could be applied in the future against today's communications, and recommend caution when choosing symmetric constructions for cases where long-term security is expected.
