论文标题
二次资金和匹配资金要求
Quadratic Funding and Matching Funds Requirements
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们研究了Buterin，Hitzig和Weyl（2019）提出的公共物品融资的机制，特别是关于其匹配资金要求，相关效率的影响以及对战略行为的激励措施。然后，我们使用Gitcoin赠款的新兴证据来确定贡献和测试我们的主张中的程式化事实。由于其二次设计，匹配资金要求的规模迅速，尤其是众多且同样贡献的项目。结果，匹配资金在资金回合的早期就耗尽了，并且有许多空间可以提高社会效率。从经验上讲，贡献者也倾向于给出少量数量，分散在多个项目中，从而加速了这一过程。除其他发现外，我们还确定了大量的相互支持，这可能与我们讨论的战略行为相一致。
In this paper we examine the mechanism proposed by Buterin, Hitzig, and Weyl (2019) for public goods financing, particularly regarding its matching funds requirements, related efficiency implications, and incentives for strategic behavior. Then, we use emerging evidence from Gitcoin Grants, to identify stylized facts in contribution giving and test our propositions. Because of its quadratic design, matching funds requirements scale rapidly, particularly by more numerous and equally contributed projects. As a result, matching funds are exhausted early in the funding rounds, and much space remains for social efficiency improvement. Empirically, there is also a tendency by contributors to give small amounts, scattered among multiple projects, which accelerates this process. Among other findings, we also identify a significant amount of reciprocal backing, which could be consistent with the kind of strategic behavior we discuss.
