论文标题
经济理论LEO卫星覆盖范围控制：基于拍卖的框架
Economic Theoretic LEO Satellite Coverage Control: An Auction-based Framework
论文作者
论文摘要
最近，高频带上的超密集的低地球轨道（LEO）卫星构造被认为是全世界供应覆盖范围的提议解决方案。 GivenSatellite星座，有效的梁覆盖方案应在卫星上雇用，以提供无缝的服务和全视图。在LEO系统中，通常使用混合宽和点梁覆盖物，其中LEO为大面积覆盖范围提供了宽梁，还有多个用于高速数据访问的转向点。在此给定的情况下，基本上需要调度变量点梁。为了实现目标，本文提出了基于Vickery-Clarke-Groves（VCG）拍卖拍卖拍卖会，用于安排多个Spotbeams以寻求更有效的无缝服务和全视图覆盖范围。
Recently, ultra-dense low earth orbit (LEO) satelliteconstellation over high-frequency bands has considered as one ofpromising solutions to supply coverage all over the world. Givensatellite constellations, efficient beam coverage schemes should beemployed at satellites to provide seamless services and full-viewcoverage. In LEO systems, hybrid wide and spot beam coverageschemes are generally used, where the LEO provides a widebeam for large area coverage and additional several steering spotbeams for high speed data access. In this given setting, schedulingmultiple spot beams is essentially required. In order to achievethis goal, Vickery-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction-based trustfulalgorithm is proposed in this paper for scheduling multiple spotbeams for more efficient seamless services and full-view coverage.
