论文标题
对无线物理层安全性的产品渠道攻击
A Product Channel Attack to Wireless Physical Layer Security
论文作者
论文摘要
我们提出了一种新颖的攻击，损害了无线系统中下行链路（DL）通信的物理层安全性。该技术基于窃听器在上行链路传输过程中通过窃听器在其上行链路传输过程中传播缓慢变化的随机符号，因此在基站（BS）观察到的等效褪色通道具有较大的差异。然后，BS在假设窃听器的频道经历的衰落严重性大于实际上比实际上更大的假设设计了安全的DL传输。我们表明，这种方法可以导致BS以比保密能力大的速率传输到BOB，从而损害了系统安全操作。通过模拟证实，我们的分析结果表明，在BS中使用多个天线可能会部分减轻但不能免疫此类攻击。
We propose a novel attack that compromises the physical layer security of downlink (DL) communications in wireless systems. This technique is based on the transmission of a slowly-varying random symbol by the eavesdropper during its uplink transmission, so that the equivalent fading channel observed at the base station (BS) has a larger variance. Then, the BS designs the secure DL transmission under the assumption that the eavesdropper's channel experiences a larger fading severity than in reality. We show that this approach can lead the BS to transmit to Bob at a rate larger than the secrecy capacity, thus compromising the system secure operation. Our analytical results, corroborated by simulations, show that the use of multiple antennas at the BS may partially alleviate but not immunize against these type of attacks.
