论文标题

Backstabber的刀收藏:开源软件供应链攻击的评论

Backstabber's Knife Collection: A Review of Open Source Software Supply Chain Attacks

论文作者

Ohm, Marc, Plate, Henrik, Sykosch, Arnold, Meier, Michael

论文摘要

软件供应链攻击的特征是将恶意代码注射到软件包中,以便将依赖的系统进一步妥协。近年来,有许多供应链攻击利用了软件开发过程中开源越来越多的使用,这是由依赖管理者自动解决,下载和安装数百个在整个软件生命周期中的数百个开源软件包的促进。本文介绍了174个恶意软件包的数据集,这些软件包用于对开源软件供应链的现实攻击中使用,并通过流行的软件包存储库NPM,PYPI和RubyGems分发。这些包裹的历史可追溯到2015年11月至2019年11月,并经过手动收集和分析。本文还提供了两条通用攻击树,以提供有关技术的结构化概述,以将恶意代码注入下游用户的依赖关系,并在不同的时间和不同条件下执行此类代码。这项工作旨在促进开源和研究社区的预防和侦探保护措施的未来发展。

A software supply chain attack is characterized by the injection of malicious code into a software package in order to compromise dependent systems further down the chain. Recent years saw a number of supply chain attacks that leverage the increasing use of open source during software development, which is facilitated by dependency managers that automatically resolve, download and install hundreds of open source packages throughout the software life cycle. This paper presents a dataset of 174 malicious software packages that were used in real-world attacks on open source software supply chains, and which were distributed via the popular package repositories npm, PyPI, and RubyGems. Those packages, dating from November 2015 to November 2019, were manually collected and analyzed. The paper also presents two general attack trees to provide a structured overview about techniques to inject malicious code into the dependency tree of downstream users, and to execute such code at different times and under different conditions. This work is meant to facilitate the future development of preventive and detective safeguards by open source and research communities.

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