论文标题
与私人价值观的沟通，重新谈判和协调
Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values
论文作者
论文摘要
如果不受新的沟通和重新谈判的机会影响，则平衡将防止通信。我们用预先播放的沟通来表征一系列协调游戏的平衡，其中玩家对协调结果具有私人喜好。一组防通信平衡是一组定性贝叶斯纳什均衡的小且相对均匀的子集。在防止通信的平衡下，玩家永远不会误会，每当有一个均衡的情况下，都会扮演共同的首选结果，并仅传达他们偏好的顺序部分。此外，这种均衡对玩家信念的变化和临时帕累托有效
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the coordinated outcomes. The set of communication-proof equilibria is a small and relatively homogeneous subset of the set of qualitatively diverse Bayesian Nash equilibria. Under a communication-proof equilibrium, players never miscoordinate, play their jointly preferred outcome whenever there is one, and communicate only the ordinal part of their preferences. Moreover, such equilibria are robust to changes in players' beliefs and interim Pareto efficient
