论文标题
选择娱乐和利润的投票地点
Selecting Voting Locations for Fun and Profit
论文作者
论文摘要
尽管对选举的操纵性攻击得到了充分研究，但直到最近才注意到攻击的攻击，这些攻击占了地理信息，这在现实世界中非常普遍。媒体上最著名的是吉利曼（Gerrymandering），其中更改了地区边界线以增加党的获胜机会，但是另一种地理操作涉及通过选择投票地点的位置来影响选举，因为许多人不愿意走任何距离进行投票。在本文中，我们启动了该操作的研究。我们发现，虽然很容易操纵线路上的投票场所的选择，但在飞机上或在两个以上的候选人的情况下已经很难。此外，我们表明，对于两个以上的候选人，这个问题是不适合的。但是，我们在平面上发现一些算法表现良好的限制案例。最后，我们讨论了在地理环境中现有的标准控制措施的现有结果，考虑在地理环境中的其他控制动作，并建议未来研究的方向。
While manipulative attacks on elections have been well-studied, only recently has attention turned to attacks that account for geographic information, which are extremely common in the real world. The most well known in the media is gerrymandering, in which district border-lines are changed to increase a party's chance to win, but a different geographical manipulation involves influencing the election by selecting the location of polling places, as many people are not willing to go to any distance to vote. In this paper we initiate the study of this manipulation. We find that while it is easy to manipulate the selection of polling places on the line, it becomes difficult already on the plane or in the case of more than two candidates. Moreover, we show that for more than two candidates the problem is inapproximable. However, we find a few restricted cases on the plane where some algorithms perform well. Finally, we discuss how existing results for standard control actions hold in the geographic setting, consider additional control actions in the geographic setting, and suggest directions for future study.
