论文标题
罗宾：通过通道随机化的已知plaintext攻击抗抗性正交盲目
ROBin: Known-Plaintext Attack Resistant Orthogonal Blinding via Channel Randomization
论文作者
论文摘要
无线物理层安全性的基于正交盲的方案旨在通过将噪声注入到正交通道的通道正交并损坏Evesdropper的信号接收中来实现安全通信。这些方法（尽管很实用）已被证明是对可以从噪声中过滤消息的多腹腔窃听者脆弱的。尽管噪声注入了噪声，但漏洞仍然源于以下事实，这使窃听者能够通过已知符号及时估算它并过滤噪声。我们提出的方案利用可重构天线来使爱丽丝在传输过程中迅速更改通道状态，并通过基于压缩感应的算法来预测和取消对BOB的变化影响。结果，爱丽丝和鲍勃之间的通信仍然很清楚，而随机通道状态则阻止了前夕发射已知的plaintext攻击。我们正式分析了该方案对单个和多安顿窃听者的安全性，并由于人工创建的快速变化通道而确定其独特的抗孔隙式属性。我们进行广泛的模拟和现实世界实验以评估其性能。经验结果表明，即使她知道通过其他天线模式传输的所有符号，我们的方案也可以抑制EVE的攻击成功率至随机猜测的水平。
Orthogonal blinding based schemes for wireless physical layer security aim to achieve secure communication by injecting noise into channels orthogonal to the main channel and corrupting the eavesdropper's signal reception. These methods, albeit practical, have been proven vulnerable against multi-antenna eavesdroppers who can filter the message from the noise. The vulnerability is rooted in the fact that the main channel state remains static in spite of the noise injection, which allows an eavesdropper to estimate it promptly via known symbols and filter out the noise. Our proposed scheme leverages a reconfigurable antenna for Alice to rapidly change the channel state during transmission and a compressive sensing based algorithm for her to predict and cancel the changing effects for Bob. As a result, the communication between Alice and Bob remains clear, whereas randomized channel state prevents Eve from launching the known-plaintext attack. We formally analyze the security of the scheme against both single and multi-antenna eavesdroppers and identify its unique anti-eavesdropping properties due to the artificially created fast-changing channel. We conduct extensive simulations and real-world experiments to evaluate its performance. Empirical results show that our scheme can suppress Eve's attack success rate to the level of random guessing, even if she knows all the symbols transmitted through other antenna modes.
