论文标题
重复拍卖的动态储备价格：向投标学习
Dynamic Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions: Learning from Bids
论文作者
论文摘要
通过重复的第二个价格拍卖出售了很大一部分在线广告。在这些拍卖中，储备价是拍卖师增加收入的主要工具。在这项工作中，我们调查了以下问题：考虑到投标人的长期激励措施和战略行为，是否可以根据先前的出价改善储备价格改善拍卖的收入？我们表明，如果已知估值的分布并满足标准的规律性假设，那么最佳机制就有恒定的储备。但是，当估值的分配不确定性时，可以使用以前的投标来了解估值的分配并更新储备价。我们提出了一种简单的，近似激励的兼容和渐近的最佳动态储备机制，可以显着改善最佳静态储备的收入。 该论文是从2014年7月开始的（我们提交给葡萄酒2014），后来在此处发布在Arxiv上，以补充2014年葡萄酒录音录中的1页摘要。
A large fraction of online advertisement is sold via repeated second price auctions. In these auctions, the reserve price is the main tool for the auctioneer to boost revenues. In this work, we investigate the following question: Can changing the reserve prices based on the previous bids improve the revenue of the auction, taking into account the long-term incentives and strategic behavior of the bidders? We show that if the distribution of the valuations is known and satisfies the standard regularity assumptions, then the optimal mechanism has a constant reserve. However, when there is uncertainty in the distribution of the valuations, previous bids can be used to learn the distribution of the valuations and to update the reserve price. We present a simple, approximately incentive-compatible, and asymptotically optimal dynamic reserve mechanism that can significantly improve the revenue over the best static reserve. The paper is from July 2014 (our submission to WINE 2014), posted later here on the arxiv to complement the 1-page abstract in the WINE 2014 proceedings.
