论文标题
Stackelberg游戏的差异隐私
Differential Privacy for Stackelberg Games
论文作者
论文摘要
本文介绍了一种差异化（DP）机制，以保护连续和相互依存市场协调过程中交换的信息。这种协调代表了一个经典的Stackelberg游戏，并依赖于系统代理之间敏感信息的交换。该论文的激励是，观察到传统DP机制引入的扰动从根本上改变了潜在的优化问题，甚至导致了不满意的实例。为了纠正这种限制，本文将保护隐私的Stackelberg机制（PPSM）介绍了一个框架，该框架将隐私保护信息的可行性和保真度的概念带入了原始问题目标。 PPSM符合差异隐私的概念，并确保保护隐私的协调机制的结果对于每个代理人而言几乎是截然不同的。基于实际案例研究的几个气体和电力市场基准的实验结果证明了该方法的有效性。
This paper introduces a differentially private (DP) mechanism to protect the information exchanged during the coordination of sequential and interdependent markets. This coordination represents a classic Stackelberg game and relies on the exchange of sensitive information between the system agents. The paper is motivated by the observation that the perturbation introduced by traditional DP mechanisms fundamentally changes the underlying optimization problem and even leads to unsatisfiable instances. To remedy such limitation, the paper introduces the Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg Mechanism (PPSM), a framework that enforces the notions of feasibility and fidelity of the privacy-preserving information to the original problem objective. PPSM complies with the notion of differential privacy and ensures that the outcomes of the privacy-preserving coordination mechanism are close-to-optimality for each agent. Experimental results on several gas and electricity market benchmarks based on a real case study demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach.
