论文标题
对比特币NG的激励分析，重新审视
Incentive Analysis of Bitcoin-NG, Revisited
论文作者
论文摘要
比特币-NG是第一个通过将区块链操作分解为两个平面的\ emph {近距离}吞吐量接近\ emph {emph {emph {近孔}的第一个区块链协议之一：领导者选举和交易序列化，是一种。它的脱钩想法激发了新一代的高性能区块链协议。但是，对比特币NG的现有激励分析有几个局限性。首先，网络容量的影响被忽略。其次，共同考虑关键块和微块的集成激励分析仍然缺失。 在本文中，我们旨在解决这两个局限性。首先，我们提出了一项新的激励分析，该分析将网络容量考虑在内，表明比特币NG即使在有限的网络容量下，比特币-NG仍然可以维持与微块采矿攻击的激励兼容性。其次，我们利用马尔可夫决策过程（MDP）共同分析关键块和微块的激励措施，这表明只有仅当自私矿工控制超过35 \％的采矿能力时，比特币的自私开采收入比比特币中的自私收入要高一些。我们希望我们对比特币NG的深入激励分析能够阐明对下一代区块链协议的机制设计和激励分析。
Bitcoin-NG is among the first blockchain protocols to approach the \emph{near-optimal} throughput by decoupling blockchain operation into two planes: leader election and transaction serialization. Its decoupling idea has inspired a new generation of high-performance blockchain protocols. However, the existing incentive analysis of Bitcoin-NG has several limitations. First, the impact of network capacity is ignored. Second, an integrated incentive analysis that jointly considers both key blocks and microblocks is still missing. In this paper, we aim to address these two limitations. First, we propose a new incentive analysis that takes the network capacity into account, showing that Bitcoin-NG can still maintain incentive compatibility against the microblock mining attack even under limited network capacity. Second, we leverage a Markov decision process (MDP) to jointly analyze the incentive of both key blocks and microblocks, showing that the selfish mining revenue of Bitcoin-NG is a little higher than that in Bitcoin only when the selfish miner controls more than 35\% of the mining power. We hope that our in-depth incentive analysis for Bitcoin-NG can shed some light on the mechanism design and incentive analysis of next-generation blockchain protocols.
