论文标题
游戏理论委托问题的理论方法
A Game-Theoretic Approach to a Task Delegation Problem
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究一个设置，其中主体选择代理商根据指定的优先级序列执行任务集合。但是，代理商有自己的个人优先级序列，他们希望执行任务。存在信息不对称，因为每个优先级序列都是单个代理的私人知识。我们设计了一种选择代理并激励所选代理人实现优先级序列的机制，以执行实现社会最佳性能的任务。我们提出的机制包括两个部分。首先，本金进行拍卖，以选择代理以最小声明为优先级序列未对准的代理。然后，主根据实现的优先级序列来奖励代理。我们表明，所提出的机制是单独的合理和激励兼容的。此外，对于代理的优先序列修改的线性成本，它在社会上也是最佳的。
We study a setting in which a principal selects an agent to execute a collection of tasks according to a specified priority sequence. Agents, however, have their own individual priority sequences according to which they wish to execute the tasks. There is information asymmetry since each priority sequence is private knowledge for the individual agent. We design a mechanism for selecting the agent and incentivizing the selected agent to realize a priority sequence for executing the tasks that achieves socially optimal performance. Our proposed mechanism consists of two parts. First, the principal runs an auction to select an agent to allocate tasks to with minimum declared priority sequence misalignment. Then, the principal rewards the agent according to the realized priority sequence with which the tasks were performed. We show that the proposed mechanism is individually rational and incentive compatible. Further, it is also socially optimal for the case of linear cost of priority sequence modification for the agents.
